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Neglected Victory
The Canadian Corps at Hill 70
Matthew Walthert

“M

any historians regard [the
Battle of Hill 70] as the
outstanding achievement of the
[Canadian] Corps,” 1 writes Terry
Copp. He is correct that the battle,
fought in and around the town
of Lens from 15-25 August 1917,
was an outstanding victory for the
Canadians, but it has not received
the same attention as other Canadian
battles of the Great War. Why is this?
While 2nd Ypres, Passchendaele, the
Last Hundred Days, and Vimy Ridge
have all merited book-length studies,
Hill 70 has been largely neglected.
The only substantial published texts
on the Battle of Hill 70 come from
G.W.L. Nicholson’s official history,
Canadian Expeditionary Force, and
Tim Cook’s Shock Troops. 2 While
Nicholson provides a very good
basic description of events, it is
necessarily a top-down history and
lacks description of the experiences
of individual soldiers in battle. In
fact, Nicholson rarely describes any
actions lower than at the brigade
or battalion level and the only nongenerals mentioned by name are
those that were awarded a Victoria
Cross. Cook’s work gives a great
description of the battle from the
soldiers’ perspectives, but there is
still more detailed analysis that can
be done, as Hill 70 represents only a
small fraction of Cook’s two-volume
opus.
Geoff Jackson published an
article on the battle in the Winter
2008 issue of Canadian Military

Abstract: For 90 years, the Battle of Hill
70, 15-25 August, 1917, was largely
ignored or forgotten by Canadian
historians. This, despite the fact that
General Arthur Currie, who commanded
the Canadian Corps for the first time
in the battle, declared it “a great
and wonderful victor y” and “the
hardest battle in which the Corps has
participated.” Why is this so? Against
tough odds, the Corps captured the high
ground and caused heavy casualties
amonst the Germans as they counterattacked. However, in the days following
this success, the Canadians pushed
their luck too far. Trying to take the
town of Lens, which Hill 70 overlooked,
thousands of men were needlessly
sacrificed.

History. He focused on the mostly
unsuccessful secondary attacks into
Lens in the days following the seizure
of the hill itself. Indeed, Jackson
arbitrarily separated Hill 70 into two
distinct battles: the attack on the hill
and the push into Lens.3 While he
acknowledged that the capture of
the hill was an outstanding feat, he
implied, by devoting the majority
of his article to it, that the failure
to capture Lens overshadowed the
entire operation. These attacks into
the town were poorly planned,
undermanned, and under-supported,
but the number of men involved
makes the attacks closer to a series
of large-scale raids than a separate
battle. These attacks into Lens will
be examined in depth later.
This paper explores the battle
in greater detail than Nicholson,
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combining the descriptions of
individual soldiers with the actions
taken by smaller units that led to
Corps-wide success on the battlefield.
It will analyze why the Hill 70 battle
has remained relatively obscure and
consider what this says about our
collective memory of the Great War.
In most works that deal with Hill
70, the role of the artillery has been
emphasized as the most important
aspect of the battle. While the artillery
had a significant and crucial part to
play, this essay will also attempt to
give the “ground pounders” their
due, as the hill could not have been
won, nor held, without them. Nearly
all the war diaries describe brutal
hand-to-hand combat for extended
periods of time, as the Canadians
fought their way up the hill, and
then struggled to hold it through
numerous German counter-attacks.
Six Victoria Crosses were awarded to
the infantry, and like any other battle,
countless brave and heroic acts went
unrewarded.
Hill 70 was Arthur Currie’s
first battle as commander of the
Canadian Corps, and he wrote that
it was “the hardest battle in which
the Corps has participated,” but also
“a great and wonderful victory.” As
well, according to Currie, General
Headquarters “regard it as one
of the finest performances of the
War.” 4 And yet, for 90 years this
battle was largely ignored in the
historiography. Certainly, when
we talk about the war today, Hill
21
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70 is never mentioned in the same
breath as Vimy, Passchendaele,
or the Somme. Perhaps this is
because Hill 70 does not have a
ready-made, engaging storyline. The
horrors of the Passchendaele mud,
valiantly overcome by the tenacious
Canadians, may be a more engaging
tale. Vimy has been elevated to a
nation-forming battle; it was the first
time the Corps fought together as a
whole. Hill 70, on the other hand, was
conceived as a diversionary attack to
keep a number of German divisions
occupied while the Third Battle of
Ypres got under way further north.
There was no romantic splendor to
the battle. The objective was not to
capture a strategic position (although
the British did want Lens for its coal
production), but rather the creation
22
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of a meat grinder of shrapnel and
bullets designed to kill as many
Germans as possible, in keeping
with Sir Douglas Haig’s policy for
a war of attrition. Still, Nicholson
devotes nearly as many pages to
Hill 70 as he does to Vimy in his
official history. In addition, Hill 70
was a more thoroughly Canadian
battle than Vimy, where much of the
artillery and logistical support for
the Canadian infantry came from the
British. Hill 70 was largely planned,
and for the most part carried out, by
Canadians. Vimy was seen as a great
victory because neither the French,
nor the British, had been able to take
it for three years. Hill 70 and Lens
had been held and fortified by the
Germans since 1914, although the
British did temporarily seize the hill

Left: Canadian soldiers practice bringing
a Vickers medium machine gun quickly
into action prior to the Hill 70 battle.
Below left: Troops of the 2nd Canadian
Infantry Brigade receive hot tea at a
Soup and Tea Kitchen within a quarter
mile of the front line on the night before
the attack on Hill 70.

during the Battle of Loos in 1915. This
is not meant to suggest that Hill 70
was as significant a battle as Vimy,
but merely that it was an important
part of the Canadian war effort. It
also demonstrated that the victory
at Vimy was not a fluke, but a sign
of things to come from the Canadian
Corps.
What, then, can we say about
Canadians’ collective memory
of the First World War, and Hill
70 in particular? Surely, we are
uncomfortable with certain aspects
of the war, or at least our perceptions
of those aspects. For example, we
are horrified by the slaughter that
took place in Europe from 1914-1918.
And we are even more horrified
by the perception that it was all in
vain. Indeed, 20 years later, we were
embroiled in an even deadlier war.
However, in the Second World War,
we knew what we were fighting
for (to stop the spread of Facism).
Although Canadians who fought
in the Great War certainly had their
own reasons for fighting, do those
of us who look back, from nearly
100 years in the future, understand
them? Maybe not. Instead, many
Canadians think of lines of men,
mowed down by machine guns.
Perhaps, unfortunately, Hill 70, like
the first day of the Somme, plays up
that stereotype, since the goal of the
Canadians was to literally butcher as
many Germans as possible. Therefore,
no matter how successful they were
in achieving that goal, there was
no way the battle would ever be
remembered the same as some of
our other victories. This limitation,
though, should not dissuade us from
further study of the battle.
2
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After Vimy, Lieutenant-General
Sir Julian Byng had been promoted
from Canadian Corps commander
to General Officer Commanding
Third Army. On 6 June 1917, Currie
was notified that he would be taking
over command of the corps, the
first Canadian to do so, and on 12
June, the king knighted him. 5 On
7 July, orders came from General
Haig through the First Army,
under command of General Henry
Horne, telling the Canadian Corps
to take the French mining town of
Lens, approximately ten kilometers
northeast of Vimy Ridge. The goal
was to prevent the Germans from
sending reinforcements north to
Passchendaele, where the British
Army was already floundering in the
mud. Currie went forward to survey
the terrain that the Canadians were
to attack. After laying in the grass
all morning, he determined that one
of the two hills overlooking the city,
Sallaumines to the south and Hill 70
to the north, would need to be taken
before Lens itself could be attacked,
otherwise the Germans would control
the high ground surrounding nearly
half the city. 6 He also consulted
his staff officers over the proposed
plan, at which point Colonel A.G.L.
McNaughton vehemently opposed
a frontal assault on the town, calling
it a “bloody fool operation.”7 Currie
brought his concerns to General
Horne, asking that the Canadians
be allowed to take Hill 70 before
Lens. Horne’s orders, though, were
to take Lens directly, so he referred
the matter to Haig. Currie met with
the commander-in-chief and easily
convinced him of his plan. Haig
expressed his confidence in Currie’s
abilities and assured the Canadian
that he trusted him to accomplish
what had been asked of the corps.8
With that, it was decided that the
Canadians would attack Hill 70 in
late July or early August.
In the lead-up to the battle, the
Canadians participated in a number
of training exercises that had become
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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standard since Vimy. The most
important of these exercises was the
full-scale rehearsal on a taped course
representing the actual battlefield.9
Deward Barnes, of the 19th Battalion,
recorded his training experiences in
his diary on 22 July, writing that for
the next few days we practiced over
tapes, getting ready for Hill 70…the
tapes were laid out as streets and
buildings according to area maps and
named before you got there. Each
man was supposed to know what
street or lane to go down when the
real thing came (all bosh).10

Even though Barnes dismissed the
training as “bosh,” it proved to be an
important part of the corps’ success,
as each man knew exactly what his
role was during the attack.
By early August, preparations
for the battle were being completed
as Currie waited for a break in the
weather. The plan called for the
1st and 2nd Divisions, with five
battalions each, to assault the slopes
of Hill 70, as well as the northern
suburbs of Lens, during the initial
attack. Meanwhile, one battalion
from the 4th Division would mount
a diversionary attack into Lens itself,
hoping to confuse the Germans
into thinking the actual attack was
taking place there. To the north of the
Canadians, the 46th British Division
set up another diversion, which
included artillery bombardments and
the deployment of dummy tanks. No
tanks were actually used – this was
to be an artillery, machine gun, and
infantry battle.
Once the attacking Canadian
infantry reached their objectives,
old German trenches on the slope
of the hill, they were to construct
strongpoints around the 48 Vickers
guns that each brigade would bring
forward during the attack. As much
as possible, Canadian artillery would
then be used to break up the expected
counterattacks. Currie knew the
Germans could not afford to lose

Hill 70, as it would compromise
their position in Lens. By taking
the high ground, Currie hoped to
draw German reinforcements into
the open where Canadian gunners
could annihilate them with massed
shellfire.11
At Vimy, the artillery used new
continuous wave wireless radios for
the first time. These radios emitted
a continuous radio wave and, by
switching the wave on and off for
varying periods of time, a person
with a transmitter and a receiver
could send and receive Morse Code
messages. As the war progressed, the
various armies on the Western Front
discovered a number of applications
for this technology, including
communication from observers in
airplanes or forward observers on the
ground to gunners in the rear. Since
the radios had worked well at Vimy,
in late July two Canadian Heavy
Brigade wireless sets were erected
at Bully-Grenay and on Vimy Ridge.
Then, the first-ever registration of
guns by wireless was carried out in
preparation for the upcoming Hill
70 offensive. It took three days, but
the results were excellent, so four
wireless stations were erected for
the battle. This would allow forward
observers more direct contact with
the artillery behind the lines.12
The artillery committed in
this battle was substantial. Each of
the two assaulting divisions was
supported by 102 18-pounder guns,
as well as 24 4.5-inch howitzers.13 All
four Canadian divisional artilleries
would participate, as well as the
46th Divisional Artillery, two army
field brigades, and a variety of other
batteries.14 Currie fought hard to have
the best possible artillery support for
his troops, knowing full well that for
the cost of a few extra shells, the lives
of hundreds of infantrymen could be
saved.15
As preparations for the attack
continued, Colonel McNaughton,
the corps’ counter-battery staff
officer, began targeting German
23
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Left: Canadian troops unload shells in
preparation for the upcoming offensive.

CWM 19920085-424

Below left: Canadian artillerymen
prepare a gun emplacement. Note the
tramline to facilitate the supply of
ammunition.

Zero hour! A roll as of heavy thunder
sounds and the sky is split by great
sheets of flame. Our guns have given
the signal.”Forward!” our captain
shouts, but his voice is lost in the
cannonade. Shells pass in salvos
over our heads and through the deep
roaring of the guns I can hear the

CWM 19930065-642

staccato rat-a-tat of machine guns.21

guns to neutralize them before
the infantrymen had to expose
themselves outside the trenches.
McNaughton had charge of three
counter-battery groups, totalling
58 guns,16 with which to harass the
estimated 102 German batteries that
faced the Canadians. By 15 August,
the Canadian guns had knocked 40
hostile batteries out of the fight.17 This
was an important factor in getting the
infantry safely across no-man’s-land
and into the German trenches.
By 14 August, preparations
were complete and the rain had
ceased. All that remained was to
get the ten assaulting battalions
into their jumping-off positions
in front of the Canadian lines. By
most accounts, the assembly went
smoothly, although most of the
battalions encountered German
shells and gas. Kenneth Cousland, a
forward observation officer with the
24
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2nd Divisional Artillery, remembered
that, on his way to the front, “We had
a good deal of gas, the new mustard
gas, and had to spend the night in
our respirators.” 18 Because of the
difficulties of moving about with
respirators on, especially in the dark,
many units did not arrive at their
positions until 0400 hours, only 25
minutes before zero hour.19 However,
everyone was ready when the attack
began.
At 0425 hours on 15 August the
barrage began and the Canadians
went over the top. Deward Barnes,
who was watching from the support
trenches with the rest of his 19th
Battalion, described Hill 70 as “the
greatest artillery fight I had ever
seen.” 20 Arthur Lapointe, in the
first wave with the 22nd Battalion,
described the opening moments of
the battle:

The 1st Brigade of the Canadian
Field Artillery, comprising just 24 of
the 275 guns active in the barrage,
fired a total of 9,856 shells in the first
24 hours of the assault.22
The Canadians had to advance
through a series of trenches,
beginning, in some cases, with the
lightly-held German front line. The
attackers’ objectives were colourcoded to allow easy identification.
The intermediate Blue Line ran across
the summit of Hill 70, through two
woods on the northern slope, and
the edge of Cité St. Emile on the
southern side of the hill. The cités
were suburbs of Lens where miners
had lived before the war. Now they
were merely piles of rubble from
destroyed buildings that offered
excellent protection for the defending
Germans. The Canadians had to cross
through several of these suburbs on
their way to their objectives. At the
Blue Line, most lead battalions were
to stop, consolidate their positions,
and allow a fresh battalion to pass
through their ranks to continue the
assault on the final objective: the
Green Line. This was a system of old
German trenches that ran along the
eastern slope of the hill and wrapped
back to the eastern edge of Cité St.
Elizabeth. The 2nd Brigade, which
had the furthest distance to cover,
had a second intermediate objective,
4
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troublesome machine gun or fortified
shell hole that the infantry came
across. Only brave charges by selfless
soldiers allowed the Canadians to
continue their advance.
As the Canadians occupied the
Blue Line, in many cases less than
half-an-hour from the beginning of
the attack, they began to consolidate
their new positions as they waited for
reinforcements. The barrage, which
had given the infantry ample cover
during their initial advance, paused
as well. The 13th Battalion suffered

CWM 19930013-801

not stopped, he continued forward,
tipped the gun back into the hole
and forced the surrender of the
officer and his surviving men. 28
Heroic actions such as these won
the day for the Canadians. Although
the artillery played an important
role in protecting the infantry, it
was up to individual soldiers to
ensure the safety of their friends and
platoon-mates. During the chaos of
the opening moments of the attack,
it would have been impossible to
call in artillery support for every

CWM 19930065-578

the Red Line, to reach before taking
the Green Line.23
Nicholson makes the advance on
the German front line seem routine
but the war diaries paint a different
picture.24 At the northern end of the
attack, the 15th Battalion met a group
of determined German defenders at
the enemy’s front line. The trench
was quite wide, and the Germans
stood shoulder-to-shoulder. Without
hesitation, the men of the 15th leapt
into the trench and engaged the
Germans in hand-to-hand combat,
with many of the enemy falling at
the point of a Canadian bayonet.25
Further to the south, the 5th Battalion
encountered the fortified “Dynamite
House.” Although it was in the 22nd
Battalion’s sector, a strong German
garrison held up the advance of
the 5th. A group of men charged
the Germans and a violent struggle
took place before the Canadians
overwhelmed the defenders.26
As Canadian troops approached
the Blue Line, German resistance
stiffened. The Van Doos (22nd
Battalion), moving through the debris
of Cité St. Laurent, found themselves
checked by a machine gun that was
causing severe casualties in “B”
Company, on the left. Two soldiers,
Lieutenant Henri de Varennes and
Sergeant Eugene Keller, quickly took
the initiative and charged the gun.
After killing its crew, they turned
the weapon around and fired on the
fleeing Germans.27 The 10th Battalion
faced a similar situation. Corporal
Nicholas Purmal noticed a group
of Germans attempting to bring a
machine gun into action at the lip of
a shell hole. He charged the position,
but was shot through the arm before
reaching the group. Slowed, but
Above right: A heavy howitzer position is
prepared in Lens. This photo was taken
in February 1918, but this type of heavy
gun was used for counter-battery tasks
at Hill 70.
Right: Canadian artillerymen load their
gun during the Hill 70 battle.
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Before reinforcements could be sent
up, the depleted company had to deal
with two bombing attacks: German
counterattackers lobbing grenades
at the tired Canadian infanteers from
intersecting communication trenches.
Despite their weakened state, the
men of “A” Company held the
position until fresh troops arrived.34
While the troops were mopping up
the remaining German positions,
Lieutenant D.M. Matheson became
involved in what the regimental
history called a “revolver duel” with
a German officer. The German fired
and missed, and was subsequently
shot dead by Matheson.35
In his memoir, Arthur Lapointe
of the Van Doos described the scene
after a mopping up party encountered
a group of Germans:

gunner from the hip as he ran. He
then bayoneted the four remaining
Germans and turned one of the
guns on the defenders.32 To the 8th’s
left, the 7th Battalion was having
problems of its own. As they began
their attack on the Red Line, they
encountered heavy resistance from
German machine guns, which were
eventually subdued with grenades
and concentrated Lewis gun fire. By
the time the battalion reached the Red
Line, only two officers from the lead
companies were uninjured.33 After
the Red Line was firmly in Canadian
hands, these two battalions began to
consolidate and ready themselves
for the final push on the Green Line.
Meanwhile, the rest of the
battalions, with shorter distances to
travel, were already approaching the
final objective. The 24th Battalion,
which had passed the 25th, had a
rough time during this final push.
One of its two lead companies was
held up by strong enemy resistance,
so “A” Company advanced on
its own. By the time it reached
Chicory and Norman trenches,
which represented the Green Line
in that sector, only one officer and
20 other ranks were left standing.

A section in the second wave has
come up a communication trench
and opened fire with a machine-gun
on the Germans, who must have
come piling up from a dugout when
our barrage had passed. Now they
lie in a mass of grey, with blood
splashed all around. One lifts a hand
to his chest and falls in a dugout
entrance. I shall never forget his face,
a mask of tortured agony.36
CWM 19920085-881

an unfortunate event as Lieutenant
Colonel McCuaig was trying to setup his headquarters in a dugout filled
with German prisoners. A member
of a mopping-up party from another
battalion arrived and, seeing the
dugout filled with Germans, opened
fire. A 13th Battalion runner was
killed and two signalers wounded,
while McCuaig himself barely
escaped injury.29 While this was going
on, the men of McCuaig’s battalion
were suffering heavily as they waited
in their new positions for the advance
to continue. The Germans directed
heavy artillery fire onto the 13th
Battalion’s trenches and, to make
matters worse, a Canadian battery
was repeatedly firing short, right
into the midst of the Canadians.
Just as the men were becoming
extremely discouraged, a piper from
the neighbouring 16th Battalion
appeared in front of them, playing
his instrument loudly as shells fell
around him. As he marched off in
the direction of his own battalion, the
men’s mood improved significantly.30
At 0535 hours, the barrage lifted
again and the men of the 13th
Battalion, along with the rest of the
attackers, advanced on the Green
Line. On the right, “D” Company
had lost most of its officers, so Major
Mathewson, from “B” Company,
took charge. He ordered his men to
crawl slowly from shell hole-to-shell
hole, since the company was well
under-strength. However, the wait
at the Blue Line had the men itching
for a fight, and as soon as some of
the German defenders began to run
from their position in the Green Line,
Mathewson gave the order and his
company charged forward, storming
the trench with their bayonets and
capturing a dozen prisoners after a
brief fight.31
To the south, the 8th Battalion
had leap-frogged the 5th and was
now closing in on the Red Line. Two
machine guns in a fortified shell hole
gave them trouble, so Corporal P.A.
Litster rushed forward, shooting one

The Germans had an intricate
system of trenches on Hill 70. Once
they reached their final objectives,
the Canadians had to deal with
counterattacks across no-man’sland, and with Germans who
attacked along support trenches
which extended away from the new
Canadian front line.
The 15th Battalion encountered
fierce resistance at their final
objective. However, by 0542 hours,
less than an hour-and-a-half after the
battle began, the Green Line was in
their hands. A trench mortar, along
The intensity of the Canadian artillery
can be witnessed by this German soldier
who was half-buried by the barrage.

8
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This oblique aerial photograph was taken from a balloon tethered behind Canadian lines prior to the battle. It shows the
area captured the 24th and 26th Battalions on 15-16 August, and the area attacked by the 29th Battalion on 21 August.

with 500 shells, was captured by the
battalion. The gun’s crew explained
its operation to the Canadians, and
the shells, 36 of which contained gas,
were subsequently fired at enemy
positions.37 From the comfort of our
couches, nearly a century later, it
may seem mutinous for a German
soldier to explain the workings of
his weapon to a Canadian whom
he knows will promptly turn that
weapon on his comrades. However,
our response might be somewhat
different if we consider that these
Germans had just been subjected to
days of non-stop shelling and seen
many of their fellow soldiers killed by
the same Canadians who were now
pointing rifle muzzles at their heads
and bayonets at their stomachs.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bent,
commander of the 15th Battalion, was
confronted by a group of Germans
who came out of a dugout behind
him. He was alone, but held his
attackers at bay until some of his men
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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rushed to his aid.38 Later in the day,
around 1230 hours, Bent would have
another close call when a German
counterattack pressed to within 50
yards of his headquarters. Bent and
a small group of runners charged
the enemy and shocked them into
retreat.39
By 0600 hours the Canadians
had reached the Green Line all
along the front, except in the 2nd
Brigade’s sector, where the 7th and
8th Battalions had stopped at the Red
Line.40 Now, the tables turned and
the Canadians were the defenders
of Hill 70 as the Germans tried to
take it back. Shortly after 0600 hours
the Canadians were already fending
off German counterattacks across
their entire front. The Germans
attempted to throw all their reserves
at the Canadians before they could
consolidate their new positions.41 It
was at this point that the artillery
played its most important role. While
McNaughton’s guns worked to

neutralize the German artillery, the
rest of the artillery began responding
to S.O.S. calls from the infantry as
soon as they saw the Germans mass
for a counterattack in the woods
or cités east of the hill. Repeatedly,
the Canadian batteries destroyed
German units before they had a
chance to move from their assembly
points. In his memoir, Sergeant
Routley of the 18th Battalion, which
was holding a section of trench in
the middle of Cité St. Elizabeth, very
close to Lens, described the artillery’s
response to his S.O.S. call:
I dropped on my knees and sent up
the S.O.S. and then dropped back
again for a few minutes to have a
little rest, before taking over my job
as lookout for the platoon. I never
seen such good [sic] Artillery action
in my life. As a matter of fact, I didn’t
think that the Artillery had worked
on my S.O.S. at all. I thought that
somebody else had seen the Germans

29

9

4/15/2010 1:26:19 PM

CWM 19920085-661

Canadian Military History, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3

coming and had telephoned our
artillery, for before the varey-lights
[sic] had finished burning the heavy
machine guns began firing over our
heads and everything on the line of
Artillery opened up. It was some
days later, when I was talking to
the Adjutant of our Battalion, Major
Bell, that I learned that it was my
S.O.S. that they had worked on. He
said that he was in the Observation
Post with an officer of the Artillery
when they seen [sic] my S.O.S. and
they immediately telephoned the
Artillery, who had their guns all
layed and ready.42

Without this sort of quick work by the
artillery, the Canadians might have
been overwhelmed during their first
hours on top of Hill 70, while they
struggled to construct strongpoints
and reverse the German defences
under heavy fire.
The work of the artillery was
made easier by the continuous
wave wireless sets. Much faster
and more reliable than any other
communication system, the wireless
sets allowed forward observers
to instantly call in targets to the
artillery. In fact, one forward
observer was completely reliant on
wireless communications once the
attack began. The German shellfire
30
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was so intense that 15 linemen
could not maintain communication
between the observer and the
artillery headquarters. However,
his continuous wave set allowed
him to continue relaying targets
and answering S.O.S. calls from the
desperate infantry. W. Arthur Steel
called the Battle of Hill 70 the birth
of the continuous wave system.43
James Edmonds recorded in the
British Official History that, during
the counterattacks on 15 August,
“not a single German soldier reached
the Canadian line alive.”44 This was
simply not the case. The artillery
could not stop all the German
counterattacks. Many times, the
artillery was either not on target, or
the barrage was not dense enough to
stop the German forces from closing
in on the Canadian lines. In these
cases, the machine gun positions that
had been established in the front lines
were very effective.45 Still, several
times German attackers reached the
parapets of the Canadian trenches
and had to be driven back with
bombs and bayonets.
The Royal Flying Corps (RFC),
with many Canadian pilots, was
also instrumental in the infantry’s
success at Hill 70. Six days before the
attack, all six German observation
balloons in the Hill 70-Lens sector

Pillars of smoke mark the start of
a German counterattack against
Canadian positions on Hill 70.

were shot down by 40 Squadron.
Then, for the two days preceding
the assault, bombers from three
squadrons attacked enemy targets
behind the front lines. During the
battle itself, two innovations in the air
war were introduced. To combat lowflying German observation planes,
the RFC employed a forward airfield
at Mazingarbe, five miles from the
battlefield. This allowed British and
Canadian pilots to take-off as soon
as an enemy plane was spotted
near Hill 70 and quickly engage the
target. Thanks to this new tactic, two
German planes were destroyed and
three shot down out of control on 15
August. The other innovation also
involved the use of the advanced
landing ground at Mazingarbe to
allow RFC aircraft more time over
the battlefield. No.43 Squadron
operated from this base, observing
areas behind the German lines in an
attempt to locate counterattacks while
they were forming up. Several times,
airmen engaged German troops
in low-level machine gun attacks,
and these planes also relayed target
information back to the Canadian
artillery.46
By mid-morning on the 15th,
most of the battalions had already
repulsed several counterattacks.
However, the 7th and 8th Battalions
were still on the offensive, trying to
capture the Chalk Pit, an abandoned
quarry that offered excellent cover
and was heavily fortified with at least
20 machine guns. It would prove a
difficult task.47 As the 7th Battalion
moved forward, Germans at the
junction of Hugo Trench and Hurrah
Alley, in front of the Chalk Pit and
the Green Line, swept the Canadians
with machine gun fire. After a fierce
battle, rifle grenadiers and small
arms fire silenced the Germans. This
10
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he took the opportunity to talk with
some of his men, whom he found
to be in good spirits and anxious
to get the attack underway, despite
the hard fighting they had already
experienced.51
Throughout the day on the 16th,
numerous German counterattacks
were mounted and summarily
repulsed. The Canadian assault on
the Chalk Pit began as scheduled.
The 10th Battalion advanced quickly
on the left, entering the quarry,
killing 100 Germans and taking
130 prisoners. 52 On the right, the
5th Battalion was held up almost
immediately, leaving the 10th’s flank
exposed. The men from the 10th
Battalion were not slowed by this
as they charged into the Chalk Pit
scattering the Germans in retreat.53
As the defenders fled, Canadian
machine gunners cut them down.
One Lewis gun team, consisting of
Privates Ewart Bateman and Harry
Baxter, lost the tripod for their gun.
Not wanting to miss the easy targets
presented to them, Baxter threw
himself on the ground and allowed
Bateman to balance the gun on his
back as he fired at the Germans.54
After a bitter fight, the 5th
Battalion eventually caught up to
the 10th at the Green Line. However,
attempts to send runners to establish
contact between the two units failed

allowed the battalion to advance as
far as the edge of the Chalk Pit, where
German fire once again stopped
them.48 It was soon determined that
the 7th and 8th Battalions did not
have the strength to take the Chalk
Pit as they were down to about 200
men. Therefore, they were ordered
to consolidate their positions on the
Red Line, where the 5th and 10th
Battalions would relieve them later
that night.49
Counterattacks continued
throughout the night of 15/16 August,
and German shelling hampered
promised reliefs. Arthur Lapointe,
recorded his experiences that night
in his diary:
We must wait for the rations which
are coming up, then we can drop off
to sleep. There is an air of relaxation
in the dugout. Even the company
commander smiles at the rough jests
of the men. Suddenly, an N.C.O.
staggers in, his face haggard and his
eyes staring. He is dusty and sweat
is pouring down his face: “Sir” he
cries, “of twenty-five men on the
ration party only three are left. Lieut.
Devarenne is dead and—.” Horror
stricken, we listen to the ghastly

In the pitch black, with German shells
and gas covering the battlefield, it
was difficult to get men or supplies
forward, and the exhausted troops
were left at the front to face another
day of counterattacks.
Overnight, the 5th and 10th
Battalions were successful in relieving
their weary brigade-mates. On the
morning of 16 August, Brigadier
General F.O.W. Loomis advanced
beyond the Red Line to ensure that
everything was in place for the
renewal of his brigade’s attack on
the Chalk Pit that evening at 1600
hours. While he was in the front lines,
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as German snipers repeatedly
picked them off. By 1730 hours,
the 5th Battalion was almost out
of ammunition after pushing back
numerous counterattacks. Private
F.J. Tingley crawled back along the
trenches collecting grenades and
bombs and distributing them to
the men. He then posted himself
on the parapet and began to snipe
at the Germans advancing across
no-man’s-land. Soon, only 15 men
could be mustered by the battalion
to carry on the fight. Consequently,
they withdrew their position 50
yards from the Green Line. At 1830
hours, a party of 50 men from one of
the support companies arrived and
the battalion retook the Green Line.
Before long their lone machine gun
was put out of action and again they
were forced to retire some 50 yards.55
With the retreat of the 5th
Battalion, the 10th’s flank was
exposed once more. Lance-Sergeant
John Wennevold held a small post
at the battalion’s extreme right. An
American from Minnesota, he had
been severely wounded at Second
Ypres and subsequently served
as an instructor in England, but
requested to be sent back to the
10th. His small party was attacked
three times and each time he was
the only survivor. Finally, with his
fourth set of reinforcements, he held

The Chalk Pit, photographed in 1919.
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the position until the battalion was
relieved that night.56 The 5th was
relieved at the same time, and both
battalions retired for a well-deserved
rest. By 18 August, it became clear
that the Canadian position in the
Chalk Pit was not tenable, so the
decision was made to pull the line
back about 300 yards from the Green
Line in that sector.57
The effectiveness of the artillery
during the attack into the Chalk
Pit is attested to in a journalisticstyle history that was published
immediately after the war, called
The Great Adventure with the 4th
Battery, Canadian Field Artillery. As
the two battalions were engaged in
a desperate struggle,

the infantry.59 Had the gunners not
continued their support of the troops
holding the line, it is highly likely that
the Germans would have been able to
retake Hill 70.
The infantry was exhausted and
the protective screen set-up by the
artillery helped to keep them alive.
Many soldiers had been in the line
since the opening day of the attack
without relief. On 22 August, Arthur
Lapointe described the situation in
his battalion:
We were to have been relieved on
the night after the attack and here
we are, a week later, still holding this
miserable sector in which so many
of our comrades have died. Each
day the enemy has tried to regain

the infantry made known their

some of the ground torn from his

distress by flare after flare. These had

grasp. Prisoners say that German

scarcely reached their zenith when

Great Headquarters has ordered the

Eighteen-Pounder ‘iron rations’ were

ground retaken at all costs and that

being distributed freely amongst the

divisions of the Prussian Guard have

Huns. So rapid was the fire that a

been sent forward for the purpose.60

wounded infantry officer, en route
for the dressing-station, peered
into the gun-pit and flatteringly
demanded, “What new type of
machine gun is that, boys?”58

However, the going was not
always so smooth for the artillery at
Hill 70. On the night of 17/18 August,
15,000-20,000 mustard gas shells were
fired at the Canadian batteries. The
German counterattacks continued,
and the strain of lifting and carrying
shells began to fog up the eye-pieces
on the gunners’ respirators. To keep
up their rate of fire and protect the
weakened infantry, many gunners
chose to remove their gas masks
rather than slow down. By the next
morning, 183 men from the 1st and
2nd Artillery Brigades had been
severely gassed. After the battle,
K.B. Jackson, a gunner with the 1st
Divisional Artillery, wrote that “we
had only five Sergeants and cooks,
and lord knows what, manning the
guns.” The gunners were heroes,
though, and recognized as such by
32
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The counterattacks, including
these elite units from the Prussian
Guard, continued throughout the day
on 18 August. On the 18th Battalion’s
front, close to Lens, a large group of
Germans broke through the line and
a savage fight to the death ensued.
Eventually, the Canadians drove the
attackers out of the trench, although
they left behind some 500 casualties.
General Erich Ludendorff, deputy
chief of staff of the German Army,
visited Lens on that day, and after
determining that this was not a major
British offensive, called off the largescale counterattacks.61 The battle for
Hill 70 was won, but the fight for Lens
was just beginning.

A

*****

lthough the 4th Division had
made a feint towards the city
on the 15th, the ultimate goal of the
battle was still to drive the Germans
out of the city. To do this, the 6th,
10th, and 11th Brigades planned a
series of attacks into Lens from 21-

25 August. On the morning of the 21
August, the 27th and 29th Battalions
attempted to push out beyond the
Green Line in the 2nd Division’s
sector. Just as the attackers prepared
to climb out of their trenches, a
German force began to advance
across no-man’s-land towards the
29th Battalion. The Canadian barrage
caught many of the Germans, but
some got through. The Canadians
soon ran short of grenades and
hand-to-hand combat ensued. After
briefly gaining a foothold in Nun’s
Alley, a trench that connected to the
Green Line but was still occupied
by Germans, the 29th was forced to
withdraw to its starting position.62
On the right, the 27th Battalion
did not fare much better. Shortly after
the attack began, the Canadians were
halted in no-man’s-land by heavy
machine gun fire. Since they were
attacking through the ruins of the
city, the Germans had excellent cover
and could hide out in the basements
of destroyed buildings. Still, the men
of the 27th pressed on and were able
to gain some of their objectives.63
As this was occurring, the 10th
Brigade mounted an attack against
the western part of Lens. Three
battalions, the 46th, 47th, and 50th
were employed, and despite fierce
resistance from the Germans, they
reached some of their objectives.
Private Percy Hellings, a scout in
the 46th Battalion, remembered
the intense fire his battalion faced:
“By the time we got halfway up
that embankment the old machine
guns really opened up on us. We
thought there must have been a
million of them – boy, the noise and
the racket!”64 The Canadians fought
through some of the defences, but the
Germans still held some positions in
their line, compromising the integrity
of the newly-won Canadian ground.
Therefore, it was soon decided to
pull most of the units back to their
original positions. The 6th Brigade
did likewise, leaving the Canadians
with a high body count and not much
12
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to show for it. On that day alone, the
Canadians suffered 1,154 casualties
including 346 killed.65
Despite these casualties, there
was still a desire to capture Lens as
soon as possible. This set the stage for
what proved to be the final attack in
the Battle of Hill 70.
The Green Crassier was a huge
pile of coal waste that overlooked
the eastern part of Lens, as well as
the Canadian lines to the west. It
was an important strategic position,
and its capture would have given the
corps possession of the high ground
around half of Lens. However, the
attempt to take the Crassier by the
44th Battalion turned into a debacle,
wasting dozens of Canadian lives.
There are numerous reasons for this
failure, one of which was the push
from Major-General David Watson,
commander of the 4th Division, to
take the Crassier. As we shall see,
the blame cannot fall solely on his
shoulders, as Haig and Horne wanted
the Canadians to take Lens all along
and Currie certainly did not want to
disappoint them. Undoubtedly their
influence, although not direct, played
a part in Canadian generals ordering
the capture of the Crassier.
At 2230 hours on 15 August, as
the first day of fighting was winding
down at Hill 70, HQ Canadian Corps
issued an order outlining future
objectives and instructing that plans
be made for their capture. One of the
objectives listed for the 4th Division
was the Green Crassier.66 Even from
this early stage in the battle, it is clear
that Currie anticipated the imminent
capture of Lens.
Five days later, 4th Division HQ
issued an order stating that if the
attacks by the 46th, 47th, and 50th
Battalions were successful on the
21st, the 44th Battalion would take
the Green Crassier. According to
this order, it would be up to the 10th
Brigade’s commander, BrigadierGeneral Hilliam, to decide if and
when the attack would take place.67
The attacks on 21 August were a
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The “Green Crassier,” photographed in 1919.

failure, and at this point, the officer
in command of the 44th Battalion
protested the plan. LieutenantColonel W.D. Davies argued that
even if his troops gained the height of
the Crassier, they would be cut off by
the strong German garrison at Fosse
St. Louis, a small rise with a cluster
of buildings to the northwest of the
waste pile. Hilliam overruled him.68
On 22 August, at 1500 hours
Major-General Watson asked Corps
HQ for permission to go ahead with
the attack on the Crassier that night,
saying that it was a menace to the
Canadian line as long as it remained
in German hands. Currie agreed,
provided Watson was convinced that
the plan was sound, the troops were
familiar with the ground, and they
had practiced the attack as much
as possible. 69 This was obviously
an unrealistic expectation, as the
battalion could not be pulled out
of the line in the middle of a battle
to go over a taped practice course.
Nonetheless, at 1720 hours, Watson
issued an order to the 44th Battalion
to carry out their operation against
the Crassier beginning at 0300 hours
that night.70
Fosse St. Louis, with a small
cluster of ruined buildings covering
access to the Crassier, was supposed
to have been cleared of enemy troops
during a previous raid, but, only
minutes before zero hour, the 44th

Battalion realized that it was held by
a strong German force. Therefore,
the task of the two assault companies
was split, with one carrying out the
original plan to attack the Crassier,
and the other directed to clear Fosse
St. Louis. The first company mounted
the Crassier rather easily in the
darkness, but the other company
faced stiff opposition including five
machine guns.71
At the break of dawn, the
Canadians exposed on top of the
Crassier began to be swept by
German machine gun fire. Since
Fosse St. Louis was still in enemy
hands, there was no way to get any
additional men or supplies to the
top of the waste pile, and soon small
pockets of men became isolated in
shell holes.72 One soldier, who was
captured on the Crassier, wrote:
The slack heap was sure an easy
place to dig in – nothing but old coal
slack and loose dirt, which was sure a
give-away to us when daylight came;
the fresh dirt thrown out showed
up so black. Then we were up so
high you dare not look out or they
would shoot you in the head from
any direction. The slack heap on the
side next [to] the Germans dropped
almost straight down. But they had
a trench they could come up, so close
to us they could throw their potato
mashers at us. First whenever they
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The vanquished and the victors – Left: German prisoners captured at Hill 70 are marched into
captivity; Right: Canadians soldiers who fought at Hill 70 head for a well-earned rest.
came at us we put them away with
our Mills bombs; but they were soon
all gone.73

As the Canadians’ ammunition
began to run out, the Germans slowly
began pushing their way back across
the Crassier. By late afternoon, the
Germans had killed or captured
every Canadian on the Crassier. Fosse
St. Louis also remained in enemy
hands .74
Although the 50th Battalion
carried out a minor attack on 25
August to consolidate their position,
the battle was effectively over after
the failure on the Crassier. The 44th

Battalion had suffered 257 casualties
in the attack, and over the next four
days an attempt was made to discern
what had gone wrong.75
On 26 August, Lieutenant-Colonel
Davies issued a note explaining why
the plan to attack the Crassier was
adopted, as well as the reasons for its
failure. His contention was that there
were not enough men or supplies to
support the troops on the Crassier.
He also noted that his officers had
expected Fosse St. Louis to be clear
of Germans.76 The reason for this was
supplied by Major Art Mills, acting
commander of the 47th Battalion.
His battalion was holding Fosse 4,

near Fosse St. Louis, during the 44th
Battalion’s attack. Someone, Mills
does not say who, was apparently
confused and thought that Fosses 4
and St. Louis were the same.77 Had
Fosse St. Louis actually been clear,
it would have been much easier to
resupply and reinforce the Canadians
on top of the Crassier.
Neither Watson’s nor Currie’s
personal diaries shed any more
light on the decision-making which
led to the failed assault. In light of
the evidence, it may be surmised
that Watson did not heed Currie’s
advice to ensure that the plan was
sound before proceeding with an
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General Arthur Currie, holding walking stick, at a memorial service to men who fell during the Hill 70 advance, September 1917.
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attack on the Crassier. At the same
time, though, he may have been a
victim of faulty intelligence, since it
seems that everyone believed Fosse
St. Louis to be clear until minutes
before the attack. Indeed, a Canadian
intelligence report from 23 August
stated that, “during the course of
last night our troops occupied Puits 4
Fosse St. Louis.”78 Brigadier-General
Hilliam must also share in the blame
for the debacle on the Crassier. He
should have taken the advice of
Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, who
had personally seen the front before
the attack and strongly protested
sending his men forward. It should
also be stated that an attack on such
a small front, comprising only one
battalion, was reckless. It was really
nothing more than a trench raid and
the Germans were well dug in around
the Crassier. With only a narrow
avenue of attack, the Germans would
be able to concentrate a large quantity
of firepower on a small section of the
front. Since the Canadians already
controlled the high ground of Hill
70, there should have been no rush
to take Lens. Instead of attacking
with one or two battalions here and
there, they could have massed their
artillery on the hill and proceeded
to bombard the Germans until they
were forced to pull back out of the
city. In fact, on 22 August, this had
already been considered. A First
Army intelligence report stated that
if the Germans were “unable to gain
more room by counterattacks, their
losses will probably force them to
evacuate Lens.”79 Unfortunately, this
avenue was never explored.
Despite these setbacks, the battle
for Hill 70 was a success. As Arthur
Lapointe watched members of his
battalion return from the front lines,
he wrote that, “Coming from the
furnace after eight days of hardship
and sorrow, the men’s faces are
haggard and their clothing torn and
dusty, but their eyes shine with the
light of pride in victory.”80 William
Breckenridge, of the 42nd Battalion,
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remembered a wounded soldier
on his way to the rear telling him
“‘Vimy was a cinch compared with
the Somme; and the Somme was
easy compared with Hill 70.’”81 Hill
70 had been a difficult battle, costing
the Corps 8,677 casualties.82 But the
objectives of the battle had been won.
Hill 70 was captured and held, and
German forces were diverted from
reinforcing Flanders. The Germans
had suffered an estimated 20,000
casualties from five divisions, more
than double the Canadians’ losses.83
It was truly a rarity on the Western
Front to have an attacking force suffer
fewer casualties than the defenders.
Thanks to Currie’s strategy, though,
after the first day of the battle,
the Canadians had become the
defenders, forcing the Germans
to counterattack through a hail of
shrapnel and machine gun fire.
The Battle of Hill 70 does not
deserve to be relegated to the back
pages of history. On the CBC’s
Flanders’ Fields radio program, a series
of interviews with veterans broadcast
in 1964, at the end of the episode on
Vimy the narrator says that “Next
week, the victorious Canadians
move down from the heights of Vimy
Ridge into that incredible bog of
mud and blood at Passchendaele.”84
Hill 70 is completely ignored, yet
Lance-Corporal Kenneth Foster, who
fought at Hill 70 as a member of the
3rd Brigade Machine Gun Company,
wrote in his memoirs that, “in order
of merit I will put Passchendaele at
the top of the class, with the Somme
second, Hill 70 third, Cambrai fourth
and Amiens fifth, they being the five
most important engagements that the
Canadians took part in.”85 He leaves
out Vimy Ridge, but the message is
clear: the men who fought at Hill 70
recognized the importance of the
battle, even if historians have not.
Hill 70 built on the reputation the
Canadians had earned at 2nd Ypres,
the Somme, and Vimy Ridge, and
was a significant stepping-stone on
their path to becoming elite troops

on the Western Front. The so-called
“learning curve” can be discerned
at Hill 70 by the introduction of
several new technologies, such as
the continuous wave wireless sets,
and the forward landing fields
allowing pilots more time over the
battlefield. The use of artillery to
create a kill-zone as the infantry
dug-in after a successful attack was
also an innovation. As well, the
successes at Vimy and Hill 70 ensured
that Currie’s methods of diligent
preparation and cooperation between
the combat arms would continue
throughout the war. In a letter of
thanks to the Royal Artillery, Currie
wrote that “success must ever be ours
when the co-operation between all
services is so marked.”86 Although
mistakes had been made, most
notably by not taking advantage of
the high ground to clear the city, the
battle had been won. Hill 70 would
become a part of the Canadian Corps’
unbroken string of victories from
Vimy to Mons, and it contributed to
the reputation of Currie as one of the
best generals on the Western Front.
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